- a six-day war launched by Israel in June against Egypt, Jordan and Syria in order to seize part of their territory and implement its expansionist plans in the Middle East.

The situation in the Middle East began to rapidly heat up in the spring of 1967. Egypt, Syria and Jordan massed their troops to Israel's borders, expelled UN peacekeepers and blocked the entry of Israeli ships into the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.

Arab states took active measures to increase the combat readiness of their armed forces and their deployment. On May 14, 1967, Cairo began bringing its army to full combat readiness. Troops were deployed in and around the Suez Canal Zone, and on May 15, Egyptian forces were transferred to the Sinai and began to concentrate near the Israeli border. On May 21, general mobilization was announced in Egypt. By May 18, Syrian troops were deployed in the Golan Heights.

Jordan began mobilization on May 17 and completed it on May 24. On May 30, a mutual defense agreement was concluded between Cairo and Amman. On May 29, Algerian troops were sent to Egypt, and on May 31, Iraqi troops were sent to Jordan.

On May 9, 1967, the Israeli parliament gave the government the authority to conduct a military operation against Syria. At that time, relations between the two countries were strained due to a conflict over water resources (the Jordan drainage problem), control over demilitarized zones along the 1948 ceasefire line; due to Damascus' support for Palestinian Arab paramilitary groups who committed sabotage against Israel. In the second half of May, the mobilization of reservists began in Israel. On May 20, Israel completed partial mobilization (according to other sources, complete). On May 23, 1967, the Israeli government declared that obstructing Israeli shipping would be considered a declaration of war, as would the withdrawal of UN security troops, the sending of Iraqi forces to Egypt, and the signing of a military alliance between Amman and Cairo. Israel reserved the right to initiate military action first. On the same day, the Israeli government instructed the General Staff to complete preparations for war against Syria and Egypt and begin general mobilization in the country.

In quantitative terms, in general and in the main operational directions, the troops of the Arab Union significantly exceeded the Israeli forces, but in terms of the general level of combat training, the Israeli armed forces were seriously superior to the forces of the Arab states.

The military personnel of Egypt, Jordan and Syria totaled 435 thousand people (60 brigades), with Iraqi forces - up to 547 thousand, and Israel - 250 thousand (31 brigades).

The number of tanks for the Arabs is 1,950 (with Iraq - 2.5 thousand), for Israel - 1,120 (according to other sources, 800); the number of aircraft for the Arabs is 415 (with Iraqi 957), for the Israelis up to 300.

In the Sinai direction, Egypt had: 90 thousand people (20 brigades), 900 tanks and self-propelled guns (self-propelled artillery), 284 combat aircraft. Israel: 70 thousand soldiers (14 brigades), 300 tanks and self-propelled guns, up to 200 aircraft. In the Damascus direction near Syria: 53 thousand people (12 brigades), 340 tanks and self-propelled guns, 106 aircraft. Israel: 50 thousand soldiers (10 brigades), 300 tanks and self-propelled guns, up to 70 aircraft. In the Amman direction near Jordan: 55 thousand soldiers (12 brigades), 290 tanks and self-propelled guns, 25 aircraft. Israel: 35 thousand people (7 brigades), 220 tanks and self-propelled guns, up to 30 aircraft.

The Arabs planned to launch the offensive first, but due to some disagreements among the leadership, the dates had to be postponed to a later time.

The offensive groups moved to the defense of the occupied areas, hastily erecting engineering structures from rather meager means at hand. Israel immediately took advantage of this. His command, fearing coordinated offensive actions by superior enemy forces from three directions, decided to defeat the armies of the triple coalition one by one before they finally agreed on a plan for joint operations.

At dawn on June 5, 1967, Israeli aircraft attacked airfields and air bases in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria and disabled up to 66% of the aircraft of these countries.

Following this, delivering the main blow on the Egyptian front, the ground forces went on the offensive. Having broken the resistance of the 7th and 2nd motorized infantry divisions of Egypt, by the morning of June 6 they advanced 40-70 km deep into the Sinai Peninsula. The Egyptian command tried to stop the enemy's advance with counterattacks, but these attempts were thwarted by Israeli aircraft. On June 8, Israeli advanced units reached the Suez Canal. The Israeli offensive on the Jordanian front began on the evening of June 5. They managed to encircle the main group of the Jordanian army and defeat it. On June 6 and 7, the Israeli airborne brigade captured the eastern sector of Jerusalem. On June 9, Israel launched military operations against Syria. By the end of June 10, Israeli troops had penetrated up to 26 km into Syrian territory. At the request of the UN Security Council and under diplomatic pressure from the USSR and other countries, Israel ceased hostilities on June 10.

In six days of military operations, Israel achieved its goals, capturing the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the western provinces of Jordan and the Golan Heights (about 70 thousand square kilometers of Arab countries with a population of over one million people). Arab losses, according to the British Institute for Strategic Studies, amounted to: 40 thousand people killed, wounded and captured, about 900 tanks, more than 1000 artillery pieces, more than 400 combat aircraft.

Israeli losses during the war were: about 800 people killed, 700 people wounded, about 100 tanks and 48 combat aircraft.

The defeat of the Arabs was due to the unpreparedness of their armed forces to repel aggression and scattered actions, which allowed Israel to defeat them one by one.

The offensive of the Israeli troops was distinguished by decisiveness of objectives, swiftness, skillful use of terrain, widespread use of various forms of maneuver, and the conduct of combat operations both day and night. The breakthrough of the defense was carried out by delivering several strikes in order to fragment it, encircle and destroy enemy troops in parts.

On November 22, 1967, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 242 on the political settlement of the Middle East conflict, which provided for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied territories and ensuring the territorial integrity and political independence of each state in the region. However, Israel has not fully complied with this resolution.

The ownership of the occupied West Bank and annexed East Jerusalem with the historical center of the city and the shrines of three monotheistic religions remains the subject of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which is not the first generation of world leaders trying to resolve.

From the Gaza Strip, but maintain a blockade of the enclave, where two million Palestinians live under Hamas rule. Attempts to resolve the status of the Golan Heights, also annexed by Israel, came to naught with the outbreak of the civil war in Syria. The Sinai Peninsula, the largest territorial prize of the Six-Day War, was returned to Egypt under the terms of a bilateral peace treaty.

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This war got its name because it lasted only six days: from Monday June 5 to Saturday June 10, 1967.

Six Day War in Sinai (Egyptian Front)

Among the Arab countries, Egypt had the most powerful air force - all of the latest Soviet aircraft. It possessed 45 Tu-16 medium bombers capable of attacking Israeli military and civilian targets. However, the Egyptians' defense infrastructure was relatively weak, and they did not have bunkers to protect their air force in the event of an attack.

On Monday, June 5, 1967, the Jews launched Operation Moked (Focus). At 7:45 am, flying over the Mediterranean at a very low altitude to avoid radar, Israeli aircraft attacked Egypt. The timing of the attack was specially calculated: most of the Egyptian fighters and their pilots were already on the ground at that time after the first morning patrol. The Israelis appeared over enemy territory not from the east, where it was natural to expect them, but from the north and west - having made a preliminary “detour” over the Mediterranean Sea.

Six Day War. Battle for the Sinai Peninsula. Video

All Israeli combat aircraft were involved in Operation Focus, with the exception of only 12 interceptors left to protect their own airspace. In 500 sorties, the Israelis destroyed 309 of 340 Egyptian warplanes. The success exceeded all the expectations of the Israeli strategists who had long ago developed this plan. Jewish losses amounted to only 19 aircraft - and mainly due to technical reasons. This gave the Israeli Air Force complete dominance of the skies for the entire duration of the Six-Day War. It predetermined the complete victory of the Jews in it.

Egypt has long lived under conditions of censorship and propaganda. By the evening of the first day of the Six-Day War, the situation of the Egyptian troops had become catastrophic, but local radio announced major victories and assured that the attacking Israeli planes had been shot down. The people celebrated. In Cairo, crowds took to the streets to “celebrate the victory,” which was considered already assured. The Israeli army advanced, and the Egyptian generals preferred to hide its defeat from President Nasser himself. In Israel, the radio broadcast only the announcement of the beginning of the war, without naming the winner. The only TV channel in Israel was Egyptian, and the Jewish population believed that their country was close to disaster.

Taking advantage of air superiority, the Israeli army attacked Egyptian troops in the Sinai. Without air support, they were unable to resist. Senior officers could not even organize an orderly retreat.

On June 8, the Israeli army completed the conquest of the entire Sinai. That evening, Egypt accepted a ceasefire agreement.

Six-Day War in the West Bank (Jordanian Front).

Israel cut off the Jordanian King Hussein from sources of truthful information. Listening to the boastful statements of the Egyptian media, Hussein believed in Nasser's victory. The Jordanian army began shelling Israel from the east and occupied the UN headquarters in Jerusalem on June 5.

Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, given the ease with which his troops advanced in Sinai, recalled part of them to Jerusalem. Israeli aircraft destroyed the Jordanian Air Force. Until now, only the western part of Jerusalem was in Jewish hands, but on Wednesday, June 7, Israeli paratroopers surrounded and took control of this entire city and the entire West Bank. According to the Jewish calendar, this date was designated as the 28th day of the month of Iyar, 5727. Since then, it has been celebrated annually as “Jerusalem Day.”

Generals Yitzhak Rabin, Moshe Dayan and Uzi Narkis in Jerusalem, 1967

Six-Day War on the Golan Heights (Syrian Front)

Until Friday, June 9, 1967, fighting on the border between Israel and Syria was limited to bombing. But on June 9, after intercepting a telegram that convinced him that the Soviet Union did not intend to intervene in the war, Moshe Dayan decided to send the Israeli army to conquer the Golan Heights, a very important strategic position for Israel. Syria was an ally of the Soviet Union, and the Israeli army had only a few hours of time - after which the USSR and the USA would inevitably force it to a ceasefire.

On June 9, the fighting proceeded with varying success: the Syrians lost their forward positions by the evening, but the Israeli advance remained shallow. However, on June 10, the Syrian headquarters, fearing an Israeli outflank through the Lebanese Bekaa Valley, ordered its troops to withdraw from the Golan Heights and build a defense line around Damascus. The Israeli army rushed into the vacated space. There was such a commotion among the Syrians that their radio announced the fall of Quneitra at 8:45 am, although the first Israeli troops approached this city only after noon.

In the face of this development, Brezhnev began to threaten the United States with direct military intervention. The two superpowers imposed a ceasefire on Syria and Israel, which came into force on the evening of June 10, ending the Six Day War.

Six Day War at Sea

8 June 1967 Israeli Navy attacked the American ship Liberty, who was collecting intelligence off the coast of the country. 34 crew members of this ship were killed. The Israeli government later stated that this very serious incident happened “by mistake.” But, according to another version, the Liberty was attacked by the Israelis deliberately - to prevent the United States from detecting the transfer of Israeli troops to the Galilee in anticipation of the capture of the Golan Heights.

Israeli saboteur divers sent to the harbors of Port Said and Alexandria were unable to damage a single ship there. In Alexandria, six of them were captured.

Israel before and after the Six Day War. Map. The Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank and Golan Heights are captured

UN Security Council Resolution 242

Soon after the end of the Six Day War UN Security Council adopted resolution No. 242 (dated November 22, 1967). She called for "the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East." The first of its principles was the “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied during the recent conflict.” However, they immediately mentioned “recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of each state in the area,” which contradicted the views of the Arabs, who did not consider the very existence of Israel legitimate. In the further development of the Middle East conflict, each side sought to see in the contradictory Resolution No. 242 a meaning beneficial only to itself.

Gamal Abdel Nasser. President of Egypt 1956-1970

The Egyptian leadership regarded the events of 1956 as a victory. Nasser, having secured the support of the USSR, which helped the Arabs with weapons and military advisers, sets a course for the physical destruction of Jewry. In particular, he publicly vowed that he would take revenge on the Jews for the Arab losses in the Sinai. In 1966, Syria and Egypt signed a joint defense pact. In 1967, similar agreements were signed by Egypt with Jordan and Iraq.
In mid-May, the Egyptian leadership demanded and obtained from UN Secretary General U Thant the immediate withdrawal of the “blue helmets” from the Sinai Peninsula, which had remained there since the Suez crisis of 1956. Thus, Egypt again regained its control over the Sinai and the Straits of Tiran, thereby blocking Israel’s strategically important exit to the Red Sea. As the commander-in-chief of the Egyptian ground forces, Field Marshal Amer, clearly expressed in those days, “how can my soldiers in Sharm El Sheikh, seeing an Israeli ship, allow it to sail past calmly? This is completely impossible!” The lack of any adequate response from the UN and Israel led the Arabs into a state of euphoria. The war was seen as a foregone conclusion, and victory in it was seen as quick and inevitable. As Ahmed Shukeyri, chairman of the PLO executive committee, said, “By winning, we will help the surviving Jews return back to Europe. However, I doubt that anyone will survive.” The Israeli government, led by Prime Minister Eshkol, on the contrary, seemed extremely indecisive at the time, trying its best to avoid bloodshed and not resort to preemptive strikes against the Arabs, forced, among other things, to such behavior by its closest allies from the United States and Europe, who refused in advance in helping the Jewish state if it were the first to start hostilities. This behavior of Israel only fueled the aggressive fervor of the Arabs.
Finally, on June 1, under pressure from public opinion, a new Israeli government was formed. General Moshe Dayan, a hero of the 1956 war, became Minister of Defense; Levi Eshkol remained Prime Minister. On the night of June 3–4, in the strictest secrecy, members of the Israeli government voted in favor of war. The Israelis chose the Sinai Peninsula as the main attack direction. The commanders of the Northern and Central Fronts received orders not to react to Syrian and Jordanian provocations, to hold out until the end and not to ask for reinforcements.
In order to lull the enemy's vigilance, on June 4, many reservists were released on leave. And on June 5, 1967, at about 8 a.m., all Israeli aircraft were scrambled into the air. Military airfields in Cairo and El Arish were bombed. Egyptian planes were destroyed right at the airfields. The Israeli command chose for the attack precisely those few minutes when there was a change of night and day duty officers sitting in the cockpits of the aircraft. Thus, in a short time the Egyptian Air Force was destroyed and Israel established its air supremacy. By the end of the day, 416 Egyptian aircraft had been destroyed, while the Israeli Air Force had lost only 26. The ground offensive then began. The main striking force of the Israelis was armored units. Israeli troops advanced in four directions: Gaza, Abu Aguila, El Qantara and Sharm El Sheikh. The further development of events was also affected by the fact that a significant part of the Egyptian army was located far from their homeland, in Yemen.

The Egyptians did not immediately realize the scale of the catastrophe that befell their army - all day on June 5, Cairo radio broadcast bravura messages about Arab tank divisions allegedly rushing to Tel Aviv and about Israeli soldiers fleeing in panic; Crowds of people spontaneously gathered in the streets celebrating the victory. The senior military leadership, aware of the actual state of affairs at the front, behaved completely inappropriately to the situation - for example, while Israeli aviation was ironing Egyptian airfields, Defense Minister Badran went to bed and ordered not to disturb him; Chief of Staff Fauzi ordered the squadrons already destroyed by Israeli aircraft to launch retaliatory strikes against the Israelis; Air Force Commander Tzadki Mohammed periodically tried to shoot himself, etc. The defeat of the Egyptian army, deprived of leadership, was thus predetermined, and even the courage of ordinary soldiers on the front line could no longer change the situation. As the commander of the 38th Armored Division (and future Israeli Prime Minister) Ariel Sharon put it in those days, “The Egyptians are wonderful soldiers: disciplined, resilient, but their officers are good for nothing.” The latter were indeed distinguished by their passivity, lack of initiative, arrogant attitude towards their subordinates and obsequious attitude towards their superiors. In a difficult situation, deprived of further instructions and directions from above, they preferred to flee, abandoning their soldiers to their fate. The Israeli army, on the contrary, cultivated independence in decision-making, resourcefulness and respectful relationships between privates, officers and generals. Israeli officers really carried their soldiers into the attack by their own example, so in the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) the percentage of officers among those killed and wounded was significantly higher than that of the Arabs.
On June 6, Gaza and Rafah fell under the attacks of the Israeli army, and the divisions of generals Tal, Sharon and Joffe began to rapidly advance deep into the Sinai Peninsula. Some Egyptian commanders, at their own peril and risk, tried to organize their own defense and hold back the Israeli tanks rushing towards Suez, but were not supported in any way by the country’s military leadership. On the contrary, Field Marshal Amer, who had completely panicked, ordered all units to immediately retreat beyond the Suez Canal. The retreat turned into a real nightmare for the Egyptian army - the Israeli army landed troops on the Mitla and Giddi passes, which served as the main transport routes to Suez, and the Egyptian army was trapped. Hundreds of armored vehicles were destroyed, tens of thousands of people were killed, wounded or captured by the Israelis. Come to Zelenograd in the summer! An amazing combination of city landscapes with the green colors of nature. The Egyptian army de facto ceased to exist, and a direct road to Cairo opened before the Israelis.
A difficult situation for the Arabs also developed on the Jordanian front. When it became clear that the defeat of Egypt was a done deal, units of the Israeli army transferred from the Sinai front began to arrive here and rushed to storm Jerusalem. The Arab legion defending this city fought desperately, but in the end, complete air supremacy and the best training of the Israeli soldiers did their job. On June 7, Jerusalem was taken, and on the same day the Israelis completed the capture of the West Bank, taking control of Bethlehem, Hebron and Nablus. After this, the parties agreed to a ceasefire.

In June 1967, hundreds of burnt Arab tanks “decorated” the landscapes of the Sinai desert

There was a lull on the Syrian front for the first 4 days of the war - the Israelis were busy defeating the Egyptian army and capturing Jerusalem, and the Syrians, having lost almost all of their aviation on the first day of the war, preferred to fire artillery at Israeli settlers rather than engage in battle with the Israeli army. Everything changed in the early morning of June 9, when Israeli divisions launched an assault on the Golan Heights. By the evening of that day, the Syrian defense was broken through, and on June 10, the heights completely came under the control of the Israeli army. On the same day, the USSR, demonstrating its solidarity with the Arab countries, broke off diplomatic relations with Israel, and on the “hot line” between the Kremlin and the White House, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A. Kosygin unequivocally told US President Lyndon Johnson: “If you want war, then you will receive it." Johnson informed him that the Israelis agreed to an immediate ceasefire if the Golan Heights were safe and did not intend to develop an offensive against Damascus. At the same time, Johnson ordered the redeployment of the US 6th Fleet to the Syrian coast. The situation in the world was critical, but a few hours later Israel and Syria agreed on a ceasefire.
The 1967 war ended in a serious defeat for the Arabs. It cost the Arabs the Old City of Jerusalem (the Arab part), Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank (Jordanian territory) and the Golan Heights (on the Syrian-Israeli border). The number of Palestinian refugees increased by another 400,000. On November 22, 1967, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 242, condemning Israeli aggression and demanding the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territories they occupied. Israel refused to implement the resolution.

During these days, the world watched the Six Day War between Israel and four countries - Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. Historians and military experts still have not unraveled the phenomenon of the stunning victory won by the IDF over the well-armed armies of the Arab states. Israel was never able to repeat the success of 1967.

Will Assad declare war on Israel?

The Six Day War (June 5-10, 1967) is one of the shortest wars in world history. Its formal reason was the blocking of the Strait of Tiran by Egypt. However, the reasons for Israel's conflict with neighboring Arab countries were much deeper. Syria and Egypt remained dissatisfied with the results of the war of independence of 1948-1949 and longed for revenge.

By the mid-1960s, Cairo had significantly strengthened its military capabilities. The Egyptian army had 400 military aircraft, 1.2 thousand tanks in its arsenal, and the total number of its troops was 240 thousand people. Damascus was assigned a supporting role in the upcoming military campaign. However, Syria's role in the outbreak of the Six-Day War cannot be underestimated.

Tensions between Tel Aviv and Damascus increased due to the lack of agreements on the distribution of water resources in the region. Back in 1964, Syria was ready to start a war to stop the construction of the All-Israeli water pipeline. Later, Arab countries began implementing their own project, which was supposed to redistribute the water resources of the Jordan River. Lake Kinneret was and remains the main source of fresh water for Israel, and meanwhile, the new water channel of the Syrians could lead to a drop in the water level in it, which categorically did not suit the Israelis. Then IDF aircraft attacked facilities under construction. In response, Syrian saboteurs committed a number of armed provocations on the border.

In the event of a war with Israel, Syria counted on Egypt's help. The country's president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, could earn good political dividends by acting as a defender of Damascus against the aggression that Tel Aviv was believed to be preparing. To be fair, it is worth noting that the Israeli military and diplomats added fuel to the fire with harsh statements about the possible overthrow of the Syrian regime of N. Atasi. On May 10, 1967, the Chief of the IDF General Staff, Yitzhak Rabin, did not rule out that if provocations continued on the border, the Israel Defense Forces would launch an attack on Damascus.

These days, Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian government media have stepped up their attacks on Israel. Egypt began a massive transfer of troops to the Sinai Peninsula. Moreover, Gamal Abdel Nasser achieved the expulsion of the UN peacekeepers stationed on the border. The Egyptian army blocked the Strait of Tiran. Nasser's actions enjoyed the unconditional support of the Soviet leadership, which consciously decided to aggravate the situation in the Middle East. Even the urgent demands of England and the United States did not force Egypt to retreat. And the redeployment of Syrian and Jordanian troops to the Israeli border made war inevitable.

“For a number of years, Israel warned day and night that closing the straits meant war. Even the great powers agreed in principle with this position after our retreat from Sharm a-Sheikh in 1957. Nasser, an experienced political player, decided to try his luck: he believed that he would be able to tighten the noose around Israel’s neck without war, despite the unequivocal statements of the Israeli government, whose population, after the mobilization, was awaiting further developments: the army with tension, the rear with great concern,” wrote William Churchill in the preface to the book "Six Day War" Israeli General Chaim Herzog.

The war began on June 5 at seven in the morning with a massive air strike by the Israeli Air Force on Egyptian military airfields. It was the first day of the war that predetermined the outcome of the entire campaign, which ended in the complete defeat of the superior forces of Egypt, Syria and Jordan. To mislead the enemy, Israel the day before published in the press photographs of IDF soldiers relaxing on the beaches, who allegedly received leave en masse.

Egypt's military aviation was the most numerous and at that time numbered 450 aircraft (in Syria - 120, in Iraq - 200, in Jordan - 18). The consequences of the crushing blow by the Israelis were catastrophic for the entire Egyptian army. During continuous attacks by the IDF, more than 300 enemy aircraft were destroyed. The Egyptian military leadership, in panic, ordered the retreat of the ground forces.

On the same day, Jordan and Syria took the side of Egypt and began shelling Israeli positions with artillery guns. The IDF Air Force, equipped with French Mirages, successfully operated against enemy aircraft on all fronts. The hostilities, which lasted until June 10, brought victories to the Israelis that will be described in many books on the art of war.

“From a military point of view, two episodes of the war were planned and successful: the attack of the Israeli Air Force on Egyptian airfields, which at that time was carried out technically impeccably, and the classic battle of Ariel Sharon’s division in the Sinai with the Egyptian division occupying the defense. There are more rumors about other battles. The rapid advance of the Israeli army to the Suez Canal was mainly explained by the fact that after the Israeli Air Force attack on Egyptian airfields, Amer gave his army the order to retreat in Syria after the Syrian army, by order of its command, left its positions with Jordan. history,” notes the former head of the Israeli intelligence service Nativ, Yakov Kedmi, in his interview with Lechaim magazine.

Within a few days, the Israel Defense Forces occupied the entire Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights, Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria. Only the adoption of a tough UN Security Council resolution on a ceasefire put an end to the Six-Day War. However, the solution to the issue of signing peace dragged on for many years.

This year, one important historical event went virtually unnoticed by the world community - the 50th anniversary of Israel's victory in the Six-Day War. There were publications in a number of foreign media. In Israel and in the countries of the Arab world, they tried not to advertise this date too much. The current military-political situation in the Middle East is not conducive to once again stirring up the memory of this armed conflict. The fragile truce between Jews and Arabs that has been achieved so far continues to hold. Many in the world understand the real cost of the status quo that has developed in this region of the planet. Accordingly, this explains the attitude of the parties to the events of half a century ago.

The Six-Day War is considered by many historians and military experts to be one of the most poorly understood military conflicts of our time. The study of the experience of the Arab-Israeli confrontation in 1967 is still ongoing. The reasons for the stunning success of the Israeli armed forces and the complete defeat of the Arab armies are carefully studied. The course of military operations and the results of the war completely contradict the established tenets of tactics and strategy for waging wars that prevailed in the world at that time.

Accents of the Arab-Israeli confrontation in 1967

After the last shots of World War II died down, the Middle East became a new “powder keg” for the post-war world. Religious and socio-political contradictions are closely intertwined in this region. The loss of Great Britain and France of their dominant position in the Arab world and the massive resettlement of Jews to Palestine led to an aggravation of existing contradictions on religious grounds. The Arabs, having gained independence from their dominions, sought to build their own regional states. The Jews acted similarly, seeking to formalize their statehood. The Arab Middle East resembled a beehive, in which two completely opposite and irreconcilable socio-religious civil communities, Jews and Arabs-Muslims, tried to fit.

Neither Jews nor Arabs were ready for a compromise in the socio-political system. The proximity of the two worlds to each other only intensified passions, which inevitably turned into armed confrontation. An attempt under the auspices of the UN to propose a two-state plan to the conflicting parties turned out to be untenable and failed. The first Arab-Israeli war of 1947-49, which resulted in the formation of the State of Israel in 1948, confirmed the irreconcilability of Arabs and Jews. The events that followed only convinced the parties and the whole world of the inevitability of a military method of resolving conflict issues. It should be noted that the Arab-Israeli conflict could not be resolved either then or today. Even the successes that Israel achieved after the six-day war could not guarantee the country a peaceful existence.

First came the Suez crisis, in which Israel for the first time acted as an aggressor for the Arabs. Later, the Arabs initiated military conflicts. The conflict that broke out in 1967 was supposed to be the revenge of the Arab world in the face of Western civilization. Israel was chosen as a convenient enemy, victory over which could become another attempt to cut the “Gordian knot” that had arisen in the Middle East.

The growing tension was facilitated by the situation in Egypt, a country that claims to be the leader of the Arab world. After the end of the Suez crisis, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser made every effort to achieve a change in the borders established after the first Arab-Israeli war. Receiving military and economic support from the USSR, Egypt had by that time managed to recover from its defeats and become a regional leader. The tone of the Egyptian leader's policy was echoed by Jordan's King Hussein and Syrian leader Salah Jadit, who sought to strengthen their positions in the region. The main ideology that united the Arab countries at that time was based on irreconcilability to the existence of the Jewish state. The Six-Day War, the causes of which are often explained by an insoluble struggle of ideologies, in fact turned out to be another armed attempt to expand spheres of influence and redraw existing borders.

In all directions, on the foreign policy and economic fronts, intensive preparations began for a new armed conflict. Each side pursued its own specific goals. For the Arabs, the main thing was to inflict a brutal defeat on Israel; Israel sought to survive the fight against the coalition of Arab countries. While Gamal Nasser sought to return territories seized by Israel and his preparations for war may be partly justified, Jordan and Syria, by and large, became involved in the conflict for ideological reasons.

Starting from a dead center

Egyptian President Gamal Nasser sent his troops into the Sinai Peninsula in May 1967, seizing positions previously occupied by UN troops. The Straits of Tiran with the port of Aqaba, Israel's only exit to the Red Sea, was blocked by the Egyptian Navy. The Egyptian leader managed to enlist the support of the Syrian authorities, who promised to strike Israel from the north if the situation escalated. It should be recognized that the state of the Egyptian armed forces and the power of the Syrian army gave the leaders of Arab countries complete confidence in the correctness of their actions.

Israel, with its population of just over 3 million people, could not deploy equivalent military contingents immediately on the northern border against the Syrians and in the south, where the Egyptian army was armed to the teeth. In such circumstances, strategic success for the Arab armies was guaranteed, but the outbreak of the six-day war showed in practice the fallacy of such a strategy. It cannot be said that the world was silently slipping into another armed conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis. The Soviet Union, although an ally of the Arab countries, did not support the intensification of military preparations in the region. The Soviet leadership made it clear to the Arabs that if Israel were the aggressor, the USSR would support Egypt and other Arab countries in military-political terms. Otherwise, when the Arabs act as the aggressive side, the Soviet Union will remain on the sidelines. In Cairo, Damascus and Amman, such statements were taken as a “green light” to unleash war hysteria in civil society.

The United States has taken a wait-and-see approach in this regard. Openly and publicly condemning aggressive preparations and the difficult military-political situation in the Middle East, the Americans secretly supported their ally. Israel was preparing to use a possible military escalation to expand its territory. The IDF command planned, as a result of quick and lightning strikes, to destroy the military potential of the Arab armies and force the Arabs to abandon their expansionist goals for a long time. Great Britain and France acted as international arbiters, trying to push through plans for a peaceful resolution of the conflict situation through the UN. Despite this, there has been movement from a dead point in the region. The tension that the situation reached in May 1967 could not evaporate so easily. Both sides went too deep in their claims to each other, the degree of civil society in both military camps was raised too high. All this only pushed the warring parties towards an armed conflict, which resulted in a six-day short-term and lightning war in 1967.

It has already been said that on May 14, 1967, the Egyptian army took up positions in the Sinai Peninsula, concentrating on the Israeli border. In addition to everything, Nasser announced mobilization in the country, which was already a serious reason for the outbreak of hostilities. The Syrians began to deploy tank units on the Golan Heights. Jordan, which joined the Syrians and Egyptians, also began mobilization in the country. The result of the Arabs' preparation for war was the formation of a coalition of Arab countries. Algeria and Iraq joined the defensive alliance of Syria, Egypt and Jordan, sending their military contingents to the Middle East.

The forces with which the Arab countries and Israel went to war

The Six-Day War is largely assessed by historians as an example of a modern “blitzkrieg”. The Israelis were able to show in practice how effective the strategy of lightning war is in modern conditions, where everything is decided by the concentration of force and speed of action. They were pushed to this by the current strategic situation at the borders. The IDF was numerically significantly inferior to the coalition forces, especially in the main strategic directions. The Israelis also took into account the technical condition of the Egyptian and Syrian troops with whom they would have to deal. Collectively, the Arab forces outnumbered Israel in tanks and aircraft. The Egyptian and Syrian navies could also counter the Israeli navy. The presence of Iraqi troops in Jordan added weight to the Arab coalition.

The Egyptian and Syrian troops were armed with Soviet T-62 tanks and BTR 60 armored personnel carriers. The Air Forces of both countries had a large number of new Soviet MIG-21 fighters and Tu-16 bombers. Almost all of the artillery of the anti-Israeli coalition was represented by Soviet-made guns. Israel could oppose this entire armada with a small, but quite modern and mobile armed force. The Israeli Air Force was equipped with French Mirage fighters. Army aviation was represented by American AN-I Hugh Cobra helicopters, and tank units had fairly new Chieftain vehicles and American M60 tanks.

From a technical point of view, the armed forces of both sides were quite modern. Another thing is how well the crews managed to master the new equipment and how competently the military command could use modern weapons in the upcoming conflict. In terms of combat training, the IDF was significantly superior to the armed forces of Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Discipline and combat effectiveness in the Egyptian and Syrian troops were extremely low. The Jordanian army also did not have high morale and training. The units of the Iraqi army deserve special attention. The Iraqi Armed Forces tank division stationed in Jordan was considered the best unit of the coalition forces.

The officers of the Egyptian army did not have a high level of training either. The shortage of mid-level officers in combat units located on the front line was 25-35%. The headquarters of the Arab armies lacked specialists responsible for the tactical disposition and technical support of troops. Gamal Nasser, aware of the serious shortcomings of the Egyptian armed forces, relied on the patriotic spirit of the military personnel and the technical equipment of the army. In the weakest of all the countries participating in the coalition, the Jordanian army, it was generally difficult to speak in any superior style. The armed forces of King Hussein, despite the presence of new types of weapons, remained at the post-war level in terms of training.

To fully understand the situation in which the six-day war began, you can familiarize yourself with the numerical composition of the troops of the warring parties:

• the armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan together numbered 435 thousand soldiers and officers;
• the contingents of Iraq and Algeria amounted to 115 thousand people;
• There were 2.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns in the armies of Arab countries;
• The air forces of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq totaled 957 aircraft of various types.

The IDF could field only 250 thousand people, organized into 31 brigades, against this armada. The army was armed with 1,120 tanks and self-propelled artillery guns. The Israeli Air Force had only 300 aircraft. In addition, the Egyptians and Syrians managed to create a 3-4 times superiority in manpower and technology in the most important areas.

Why the six day war?

The armed conflict that broke out in the Middle East in June 1967 became known in history as the “Six Day War” because:

• it took the Israeli armed forces only six days to defeat the main groups of Arab countries concentrated in the main strategic directions;
• in six days, the Israelis managed not only to push back Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian troops from their positions, but also to capture much larger territories;
• six days of intense fighting on three fronts at once, in Sinai, on the Golan Heights and on the West Bank of the Jordan River;
• in six days, Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian troops lost all their military-technical potential, ensuring the subsequent conduct of military operations.

A distinctive feature of the armed conflict of 1967 is that the attacking side was unprepared for the enemy’s counterattack actions. The Egyptian troops deployed to positions, like the Syrian army, lost their combat potential and offensive spirit in the three weeks preceding the fire phase of the conflict. Israel, being in a obviously losing position, was forced to attack first. The factor of surprise played a role, allowing the IDF not only to deliver a preemptive strike to the enemy and destroy his strike forces, but also to seize the strategic initiative into its own hands.

The history of the fleeting six-day war is replete with thousands of facts in detail that indicate that Israel was ready for such a development of events. Having well-established intelligence and competent commanders in the army units, the Israeli army inflicted precise and lightning-fast strikes on its opponents. The entire cumbersome army machine of the Arab countries was not ready for such a rapid development of events. In the first three days, the Syrians lost their tank forces in useless attacks. The Egyptian army, deprived of air cover, lost stability and was forced to constantly retreat under the attacks of a few IDF units.

Jordan, which was least prepared for military action, resisted only in the Jerusalem area. In 2-3 days, Israeli units managed not only to oust Jordanian troops from the Holy City, but also to continue moving into the West Bank. The Iraqi tank division, considered the elite unit of the Arab armies, was defeated and scattered by Israeli aircraft. The results of the six-day war impress not only historians, but also analysts. Many experts are still arguing about how a country, inferior to the enemy in military potential, managed to immediately achieve so many successes.

The result of the armed confrontation was Israel's exit from the tight ring of encirclement. Jordan was removed from the list of real competitors for a long time. Syria, having lost the Golan Heights, found itself drained of blood. Israeli tanks were now one day's march from Damascus and the Jordanian capital Amman. On the Sinai front, the Israelis reached the shores of the Suez Canal, freeing Aqaba and the entire Gulf of Tiran from the blockade.